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We study the effectiveness of recovery strategies for a dynamic model of failure spreading in
networks. These strategies control the distribution of resources based on information about the
current network state and network topology. In order to assess their success, we have performed a
series of simulation experiments. The considered parameters of these experiments are the network
topology, the response time delay and the overall disposition of resources. Our investigations are
focused on the comparison of strategies for different scenarios and the determination of the most
appropriate strategy. The importance of prompt response and the minimum sufficient quantity of
resources are discussed as well.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 89.75.Fb, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
The efficient distribution of resources is a challenging
problem relevant for many types of complex networks.
The examples include social networks [1], power trans-
mission grids [2], communication systems [3, 4], and road
infrastructures [5]. Physicists, in the past years, have
studied their structure and considerably contributed to
the understanding of processes going on these networks.
The efficient immunization against the epidemic spread-
ing of diseases and strategies for failure prevention are
important topics with many practical implications in real
systems. Scientists have recently demonstrated the ben-
efits of targeted [6, 7, 8] and acquaintance immunization
[9] in scale-free networks, have studied the applicability
of ”flooding” dissemination strategies based only on local
information [10], and have proposed efficient strategies
for eliminating cascading effects in networks [11, 12].
In contrast to these works we would like focus on inter-
dependent systems and on the spreading dynamics of dis-
astrous events between the networked components. Dis-
astrous events are bothering mankind from the earliest
days. The ability to recover the functionality of dam-
aged infrastructures promptly is crucial for survival and
determines, whether the affected areas will overcome the
consequences of catastrophe or not. Emergency response
and recovery call for external resources, which are limited
and, therefore, have to be deployed as efficiently as possi-
ble. The question how to effectively distribute resources
in order to fight disasters best has already been addressed
by many researchers. As examples, we mention the re-
distribution of medical material [13], the mitigation of
large-scale forest fires [14], and the fighting of floods [15].
An experimental study of disasters under real world
conditions is almost impossible, and therefore, mathe-
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matical and computer models are often very helpful tools
to extend human knowledge. However, the complexity of
systems struck by disasters does not allow one to model
the interactions of all involved entities and processes in
detail. Therefore, we have to capture them by an ap-
propriate generic model. Disastrous events are often
characterized by cascading failures [16] propagating in
the system due to the causal dependencies between sys-
tem components. These casual dependencies result from
structural and functional interdependencies and can be
modeled by directed networks. Note that there were sev-
eral attempts to quantify such networks for particular
cases, using interaction network approaches [17] or fuzzy
cognitive maps [18]. Loops in these networks are crucial,
since the amplification of negative effects through the
loops may considerably deteriorate the situation. Such
loops are sometimes called ”vicious circles”.
The above mentioned view of disasters has led us to
the formulation of a general spreading model of failures
in networks [19]. To assess the importance of the avail-
ability of information about the network on the efficiency
of disaster recovery, in this paper we will study the ef-
fect of different protection strategies. These strategies
are based on different information evaluation and con-
trol the distribution of resources over the system com-
ponents. As parameters in our model, we consider the
overall quantity of resources R, the recovery time delay
τstart, and the network topologyMij . As our simulations
did not give qualitatively different results for varying link
weightsMij , we will not discuss the case of heterogeneous
network links in this paper. Our presented simulation re-
sults rather focus on the average efficiency of the consid-
ered strategies and on the ”worst-case” scenario, which is
given by the most ”unfriendly” realization of all random
parameters.
Our paper is organized as follows: Sec. II presents our
mathematical model of disaster spreading. In Sec. III,
we describe the mobilization process of resources. Disas-
ter recovery modeling issues and protection strategies are
2discussed in Sec. IV, while the results of our computer
simulations are presented in Sec. V. To conclude this
paper, Sec. VI summarizes the most important findings
and outlines possible directions of future research.
II. MODELING THE DYNAMICS OF
DISASTER SPREADING
In this section, we briefly summarize our model of dis-
aster spreading originally proposed in [19]. The model
is based on a graph G = (N ,S) of interconnected sys-
tem components i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}. The directed links
(i, j) ∈ S, with i, j ∈ N , represent structural and func-
tional dependencies between the components. The state
of a node i at time t is described by a continuous vari-
able xi(t) ∈ R, where xi = 0 corresponds to a normal
functioning of the component. The deviation from this
state, caused by disturbances, represents the level of chal-
lenge of system component i. At the present stage of ab-
straction, we do not consider diverse functionalities of the
components and we assume an additive impact of exter-
nal disturbances coming from neighboring components.
Each real system exhibits a natural level of resistance
to challenges. We reflect this tolerance by a special
threshold θi > 0 and assume that a node tends to fail,
when the sum of all disturbances acting on it exceeds this
value [15]. Rather than by a discontinuous step function
we describe this by the sigmoidal function
Θ(y) =
1− exp (−αy)
1 + exp [−α(y − θi)]
, (1)
where α is a ”gain parameter”.
The interactions between the components are quan-
tified by the connection strengths Mij and by the link
transmission time delays tij > 0. The overall dynamics
of a node is then given by:
dxi
dt
= −
xi
τi
+Θ

∑
i6=j
Mjixj(t− tji)
f(Oj)
e−βtji

 , (2)
where the first term on the right-hand side models the
ability of component i to recover from perturbations
and the second term describes the superposition of all
pertubative influences by adjacent nodes j on node i.
If xi 6= 0, the recovery term tends to drive xi back to
zero. The recovery rate 1/τi characterizes the speed
of the recovery process at node i ∈ N . The func-
tion f(Oj) = (aOj)/(1 + bOj) introduces an additional
weight to reflect that the impact of highly connected
neighboring nodes is smaller, because their influence is
distributed among many nodes and in this way ”dissi-
pated” [20]. Oj is the out-degree of node j while a = 4
and b = 3 are fit parameters.
The disturbances, as they are transmitted over the
links, can be strengthened or weakened by different fac-
tors like for instance the time delays or physical proper-
ties of the surrounding. The intensity of this process can,
in our model, be controlled by the parameter β. In the
experiments we have used β = 0.025, which corresponds
to relatively weak damping of disturbances on links.
A. Setup of Our Simulation Experiments
Our simulation studies were performed for four types of
directed networks representing different systems. Specifi-
cally, we have studied networks such as regular (grid) net-
works, random networks, scale-free networks, and small-
world networks.
Only regular (grid) networks were specified with
bidirectional links. The directed scale-free networks
were generated using the algorithm by Bolloba´s, Borgs,
Chayes, and Riordan [21], where the attachment of
new node is controlled by probabilities α1, β1, γ1 with
α1 + β1 + γ1 = 1 and by non-negative parameters δin
and δout. These parameters have been set to α1 = 0.1,
β1 = 0.8, γ1 = 0.1, δin = 2 and δout = 2.
Small-world networks have been generated using the
procedure described in Ref. [22]. This procedure
slightly generalized the generation of undirected small-
world graphs proposed by Watts and Strogatz [23]: In
contrast to their original algorithm, we have randomly
assigned directions to links, with probabilities for clock-
wise and counter-clockwise direction of 0.3 each, while
a bidirectional link has been assumed with probability
0.4. Finally, a random rewiring procedure with rewiring
probability p = 0.3 has been applied.
In addition, we have generated random networks of the
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi type. All networks have been generated in a
way that the resulting average node degree was approx-
imately 3.6. The grid network was organized in 25 rows
each containing 20 nodes.
Throughout this paper, all computer-generated net-
works are composed of 500 nodes. Moreover, our homo-
geneous parameter settings assume that all θi = 0.5 and
all Mij = 0.5, where a link from node i to j exists, oth-
erwise Mij = 0. The time delays tij are χ
2-distributed,
where we have chosen µ = 4 for the number of degrees
freedom of the χ2-function. However, the distribution
was stretched multiplying by factor 0.05 and shifted by
adding the value 1.2 in order to get an average delay of
〈tij〉 = 1.4.
III. MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES
Let us assume that the emergency forces and all ma-
terial flows are entering the affected area continuously in
time. This process can be modeled by a continuous func-
tion, which defines, how much resources have reached
an affected area at time t. The shape of this function
3is an essential point of our model, because the prompt
mobilization of resources a has strong influence on the
efficiency of countermeasures [24]. Despite the frequent
occurrence of disasters, we found only a few publications
that provide a detailed information about the progress
of mobilization in time. For example, Fig. 1 shows the
manpower and vehicles, which were involved in the re-
covery activities to fight the Elbe river flooding in Ger-
many in August 2002 [25]. Both curves are quantitatively
similar and can be well approximated using the function
r(t) = a1t
b1e−c1t, where a1, b1 and c1 are fit parameters.
The mobilization itself is represented by the growing part
of the curve. To reflect the progress of mobilization of ex-
ternal resources in our simulations, we have used the ap-
proximate fit curve for manpower. Besides time progress
of the mobilization, further important parameters are the
overall quantity of external resources R and the response
time tD. The response time is the time interval between
the occurrence of the initial disastrous event and the first
provision of resources.
The resources used for the recovery are assumed to
be distributed in time according to the manpower data
presented in Fig. 1. We have normalized the magnitude
of this curve according the total amount of resources R,
keeping its shape. The time period during which the
distribution of resources takes place was set to half of
the simulation time horizon, i.e. 50 time steps.
IV. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND DISASTER
RECOVERY
Disasters come mostly unexpected, and the first mo-
ments after their occurrence are characterized by a high
uncertainty in the estimation of the overall impact. Cri-
sis management coordinates the work of all emergency
units and often has to take decisions based on scarce in-
formation. This requires a reliable organization in term
of information flows [26, 27], their evaluation and the
choice of appropriate respose strategies.
To uncover what information is most important for
efficient disaster response, we study here the properties
of several recovery strategies, allocating the resources to
components based on different information. As first kind
of information, let us consider the knowledge of the com-
ponent’s connectivity, i.e. the out-degrees and in-degrees
of the nodes. This information allows one to uncover
those components, which influence most other compo-
nents and those which are easily vulnerable, because they
have many in-going links. As second kind of information
we assume that the locations and seriousness of malfunc-
tions in the network are well-known. This information
reflects the current level of node damage and allows one
to prioritize the nodes which are more seriously damaged.
Considering these two kinds of information, we have for-
mulated the following recovery strategies Si:
S1 uniform dissemination, i.e. each node gets the
same amount of resources,
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FIG. 1: Manpower and number of vehicles fighting the Elbe
river flooding in August 2002 [25]. The dashed lines represent
the approximation by the function r(t) = a1t
b1e−c1t. The
best fit parameters for manpower (top) are a1 = 530, b1 =
1.6, c1 = 0.22, while for vehicles (bottom) they are a1 = 41,
b1 = 0.66, c1 = 0.069.
S2 out-degree based dissemination, i.e. the resources
are distributed over nodes proportionally to their
out-degrees,
S3 uniform reinforcement of challenged nodes, i.e. all
nodes i ∈ N with xi > 0 are equally provided with
resources,
S4 simple targeted reinforcement of destroyed nodes,
i.e. damaged nodes (xi > θi) are equally provided
with resources with priority, while challenged nodes
(xi > 0) are uniformly reinforced if no damaged
nodes exist,
S5 simple targeted reinforcement of highly connected
nodes, i.e. a fraction q of highly connected nodes
is uniformly provided with resources by using the
fraction k of all resources, while the remaining re-
sources are applied according to strategy S4,
S6 out-degree based targeted reinforcement of destroyed
nodes, i.e. application of strategy S4, but with a
4distribution of resources proportional to the out-
degrees of nodes rather than a uniform distribution.
Equation (2) represents the mitigation activities in the
nodes by the recovery rates 1/τi. It models a situation
without additional external forces sent to challenged sys-
tem components to perform mitigation actions. Thus, at
the beginning it is assumed that the mitigation activities
are weak (1/τi = 1/τstart = 0.25), because they are based
only on internal resources. If these internal resources are
not sufficient to cope with the evolving disaster, exter-
nal resources have to be mobilized. The assignment of
external resources to a node is assumed to increase the
recovery rate 1/τi(t) of a node according to
1
τi(t)
=
1
(τstart − β2)e−α2Ri(t) + β2
. (3)
Our model assumes that, once resources have been as-
signed to a node, they will remain at the selected node
and are not reassigned again. In Eq. (3), the cumulative
amount of resources assigned to node i is denoted by Ri.
The formula reflects the fact that each new unit of re-
sources has a smaller effect than the previous one, which
is due to the decreasing efficiency of recovery activities,
when the concentration of forces grows. These effects are
well-known and may be explained by increasing efforts
for communication and the coordination of forces. The
influence of this effect is represented by the fit parameter
α2 = 0.58. The parameter 1/β2 = 5 defines an upper
bound of the recovery rate.
When developing formula (3), we have required the
following:
1. Resources have only positive influence on the state
of the node. In other words, the function 1/τi
should grow monotonously with the parameter Ri.
2. When there are no resources applied in node i i.e.,
Ri = 0, then 1/τi = 1/τstart > 0.
3. Finally, we expect a limited speed of recovery pro-
cess. In fact, for Ri →∞ we have 1/τi(t) = 1/β2 >
0.
Formula (3) obeys all three conditions, and we expect
qualitatively similar results for all continuous functions
satisfying these conditions.
V. RESULTS OF OUR SIMULATION
EXPERIMENTS
We have extensively studied the properties of protec-
tion strategies by means of computer simulations. Due
to the existence of random parameters, such as tij , the
results of the simulation experiments varied with the re-
alizations of the random variables. Experiments started
at time t = 0, when the xi variable of one randomly
TABLE I: Values of Rmin obtained for strategies S1 and S2.
The rows correspond to the different network types: square
grid (GR), small-world networks (SW), Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks
(ER), and scale-free networks (SF). The variance in data was
obtained by tD moving over values 0, ..., 15.
S1 S2
GR 1954 ± 25 2223 ± 66
SW 1861 ± 8 1993 ± 4
ER 1701 ± 4 1521 ± 7
SF 2203 ± 0 1205 ± 6
selected node i was set to the value τstart for 10 time
units. Figure 2 shows an example how the average num-
ber of damaged nodes than develops in the course of time.
The existence of hubs causes that the perturbation prop-
agates much faster in scale-free networks than in grids,
but on the other hand, the protection strategies work
more efficiently, when they can focus on these highly con-
nected nodes. To assess the behavior of our model, we
have evaluated the most unpleasant scenario, which oc-
curs when we consider the most unfriendly realization
of the random parameters. One possible characteristics,
which reflects this ”worst-case” scenario, is the depen-
dence of the minimal quantity of resources Rmin required
to recover the network on the response time delay tD. It
defines a success threshold for each considered strategy.
Except for this, we have evaluated the average damage of
the respective network. Therefore, all experiments have
been performed with the same simulation time horizon
(tS = 100).
A. Worst-Case Scenario
In this subsection we determine the minimum required
resources Rmin as a function of response strategy and the
network topology, and we study how Rmin changes when
the response time delay increases. Rmin is the minimum
quantity of resources which guarantees the complete re-
covery of the network for each particular scenario. We
estimate this quantity by performing a huge amount of
numerical calculations separately for each studied net-
work. In each simulation run, the location of the initial
disturbance and the time delays tij are randomly varied.
To obtain Rmin, we use the bisection method.
As the simplest strategies S1 and S2 do not take into
account the current level of damage, the failures propa-
gate over the whole network, and the minimum required
resources are independent of the response time delay.
The Rmin values are listed in Table I. Strategy S1 de-
mands the highest disposition of resources in scale-free
structures. This adverse behavior of scale-free networks
arises due to the difficulties in the recovery of hubs and
can be eliminated by preferential reinforcement of nodes
with high out-degrees (compare the Rmin values of strate-
gies S1 and S2).
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Average number of damaged nodes
(xi > θi) for scale-free networks and a regular grid networks,
applying different protection strategies. Dashed-dotted line:
no disposition of resources for recovery. Solid line: strategy
S3. Long-dashed line: strategy S4. Short-dashed line: strat-
egy S5. Dotted line: strategy S6. The value of the response
time was set to tD = 8 and the overall disposition of resources
to R = 1000 (apart from the dashed-dotted line, where R =
0).
For the damage-based strategies S3 and S4 (see Fig. 3)
we observe two basic types of behavior: Within the stud-
ied range of response time delays tD, the values of Rmin
are either growing, or they stay approximately constant.
If they are growing with tD, the resources are sufficient to
repair the network before the failures affected the whole
network. In the region where Rmin does not change sig-
nificantly with increasing tD, damage spreads all over the
network. Therefore, the resources required to restore the
failure-free state of the network are always the same.
Our data show the highest spreading velocity for scale-
free networks and the slowest spreading for regular grids.
The Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and small-world networks are some-
where in between and the transition point between the
growing and the constant part of Rmin(tD) represents
the critical value of tD beyond which failures paralyze
the complete network.
Small-world networks and, to some degree, scale-free
networks as well show a decrease of Rmin for large values
of the response delay time tD, which is surprising (see
Fig. 3, strategy S3). This decrease indicates the unbal-
anced distribution of resources, where there is a surplus
of resources in some nodes and a deficit elsewhere. The
relationship between the velocity of failure propagation
and resources mobilization is crucial for damage-based
protection strategies. The spreading velocity is increased
by the existence of a small-world effect, which is based
on the existence of long-range links (shortcuts). Over
these shortcuts, failures spread very fast to distant parts
of the network. Consequently, the resources must be dis-
tributed over a large area. However, if tD is small, they
are deployed less uniformly, because the majority of re-
sources is deployed during the time when only a small
part of the network is affected by failures. In such situa-
tions, we can find groups of interconnected nodes, which
have been less provided with resources. Later on, these
nodes require an additional effort to be repaired. In con-
trast, when tD is large, the resources are distributed more
uniformly and the overall demanded quantity of resources
is smaller.
In practice, this calls for a precise assessment of the
propagation velocity and mobilization rates, which is pos-
sible only when the eventually occurring damages can be
identified in advance. Taking into account information
about the network structure, which determines the pos-
sible sequence of failure occurrence, this problem can be
significantly reduced (see Fig. 3, strategy S4).
In order to decrease the spreading velocity in scale-
free networks, we suggest to apply strategy S5, which
stresses the protection of highly connected nodes. Em-
ploying a simple heuristic algorithm, we have found val-
ues of the parameters k and q, which minimize Rmin.
The reduction is highest for k = 0.8 and q = 0.15 (see
Fig. 3). Although strategy S5 utilizes the detailed infor-
mation about the current damage and network structure,
the values of Rmin for scale-free networks are larger for
small values of tD compared to other networks treated
by strategies S3 and S4. On the other hand, for long
response time delays tD, the smallest disposition of re-
sources is sufficient to recover scale-free networks.
B. Results for average impact of the different
strategies
Before we compare the efficiency of the different disas-
ter response strategies, we will shortly discuss the influ-
ence of the strategy parameters on the efficiency of the
recovery strategies and take a look at the probabilistic
distribution of damage.
A shortage of resources R or a large response time
delay tD can hardly be compensated for, even by sophis-
ticated protection strategies. In the Fig. 4, we compare
the typical damage when applying strategy S1 or strat-
egy S6. Strategy S6 was found to be the most efficient
one in simulation experiments, while strategy S1 was the
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FIG. 3: Minimum quantity of resources Rmin needed to re-
cover a challenged network as a function of the response
time delay tD. Squares correspond to bidirectional grid net-
works, plus signs to scale-free networks, multiplication signs
to Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks and circles to small-world networks.
The inset shows Rmin obtained for scale-free networks after
the applying of strategy S5 (k = 0.8, q = 0.15)
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Relative difference in damage D6,1 =
〈D6〉
〈D1〉
100% between the application of the efficient strategy S6
and the inefficient strategy S1. The dashed line corresponds
to parameter combinations for which the difference between
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ference of 80%. The curves have been obtained by simulations
using the bisection method.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Cumulative probability distribution
of the overall damage 〈D6〉 for a sample of numerical exper-
iments for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks with a fixed disposition of
resources R = 1000 and different values of tD. The dashed
line corresponds to tD = 0, the dashed-dotted line to tD = 8,
and the solid line to tD = 16.
most inefficient one (see below). The damage Di related
to strategy Si, was quantified by the time integral over
the number of destroyed nodes. All results in this sub-
section are expressed through the average damage 〈Di〉,
where we varied the initially disturbed node.
Our results show only small differences between the
strategies, when tD is large or R is small. However the
overall damage of strategies S1 and S6 declines, when
R grows and tD decreases. The superiority of strategy
S6 over the strategy S1 is most significant in the region
of large resources R and short response delays tD. Thus,
improvements in the protection strategy have the highest
effect when the response time delay and the disposition of
resources for recovery are within reasonable limits, while
late response cannot be compensated for even by the best
strategies. Similar results have been found for smallpox
outbreaks in social networks [24].
A growing response time delay has a strong impact on
the distribution of damage. When we fix the amount
of resources R and vary tD, the damage 〈Di〉 is typi-
cally distributed in the way shown in Fig. 5. For small
values of tD, the recovery process is able to repair the
network in a very short time (dashed line). For inter-
mediate values of tD two distinct situations are observed
(dashed-dotted): Depending on the initial disturbance
and on the random parameters, the spreading is either
quickly stopped and the network is recovered. Or, the re-
covery process is not able to interrupt cascade failure over
the entire network, when the number of infected nodes
exceeds a certain quantity. For R > Rmin, the system
is still repaired, but much later, than for small values
of tD. Thus, for intermediate response time delays we
can expect a big discrepancy between the damage in the
best and the worst case scenario. This behavior strongly
reminds of the initial phase of real disasters, where an
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Most efficient strategies of disaster
recovery based on the evaluation of average damage.
apparently irrelevant event like a small social conflict, a
thrown cigarette or a delayed disposal of waste can, under
similar conditions, either vanish without any significant
impact or trigger riots, forest fires or epidemics.
In order to answer the question which strategies are
more proper for which kinds of networks, we have com-
pared the average damage 〈Di〉 for a matrix of param-
eter combinations (with tD ∈ {0, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20} and
R ∈ {200, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000}). As the behavior of
small-world networks is very similar to Erdo¨s-Re´nyi net-
works, we omitted them in Fig. 6. The strategy S5 has
been particularly suited for scale-free networks to reach
the minimum disposition of resources required for net-
work recovery. This strategy is most efficient for values
of R close to Rmin. For Erdo¨s-Re´nyi, small-world and
grid networks, the success of this strategy depends on
the respective values of R. Strategy S5 is relatively ef-
fective, when R is small and tD is large (note, that for
this combination of parameters the differences between
the strategies are very small, see Fig. 4). However, when
R is large, strategy S5 performs poorly, due to the ex-
cessive provision of resources to a small group of nodes
regardless of the damage. The most universal and also
most effective of all investigated strategies is strategy S6.
On the other hand, (together with strategy S5), it also
requires the most detailed information.
The overall results of our comparison can be summa-
rized as follows: If we have the option to choose whether
to orient the disaster recovery strategy at the network
structure or at the current damage, then, regular grids
with a small spreading velocity are protected best by
strategies reacting to the level of damage. In contrast, for
scale-free networks it is more effective to take the network
structure into account. The choice of the proper strat-
egy for Erdo¨s- Re´nyi and small-world structures depends
on the response time delay. For short time delays, there
is a good chance to reduce the spreading by preferential
protection of damaged nodes, but when the time delay
is large and many nodes have already been affected, the
damage is minimized by protection of nodes with high
out-degrees.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Disaster recovery and the operation of inter-connected
infrastructures involve an intricate decision making
where each action can invoke a variety of hardly pre-
dictable reactions. Here the network type plays an im-
portant role, and the theory of complex systems and the
statistical physics of networks offer powerful methods.
These allow one to gain a better understanding of the
dynamics of disaster spreading and to derive valuable re-
sults how to fight them best.
In this paper, we have specifically studied the efficiency
of several strategies to distribute resources for the re-
covery of disaster-struck networks. These strategies use
information about the network structure and knowledge
about the current damage. As main parameters, we have
considered the overall quantity of resources R and the
response time delay tD. By means of simulations, we
have determined the minimum disposition of resources,
which is necessary to stop disaster spreading and recover
from it. The behavior of scale-free networks was found to
be ambiguous. In comparison with other network struc-
tures, the highest quantity of resources for recovery is
needed in case of small response time delays, while the
required disposition of resources is smallest for large time
delays.
When the response time delay and disposition of re-
sources are within reasonable limits, the optimization
of protection strategies has the largest effect. Further-
more, strategies oriented at the network structure are
efficient for scale-free networks, while strategies based on
the damage are more appropriate for regular grid net-
8works. The suitable strategy for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and small-
world networks depends on the response time delay. In
case of short time delays, the damage reduction is higher
for damage-based strategies, whereas strategies oriented
at information about the network structure are better
for large response time delays. Therefore, we expect that
the properties of response strategies could be further im-
proved by switching between different strategies in time.
This will be a subject of our forthcoming investigations.
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